Introduction
Although the productivity slowdown of the world economy was observed and documented before 2008, it is the crisis itself that fuelled debates on its sources and its economic nature (McGowan, Andrews, & Nicoletti, 2015) . Van Ark et al. (2015) summarize the causes of this global slowdown as inefficient investments in machinery, human capital and organizational processes.
This can include the skill mismatches and a lack of technology diffusion from advanced to laggard firms. To what extent is this global view helpful in understanding the productivity slowdown in Russia?
The present paper considers the post-transition and resource abundant Russia and compares the pre-and post-crisis productivity patterns. The standard tool kit of Solow (1957) and Jorgenson et al. (1987; 2005) to answer these questions is industry growth accounting decomposition, which represents output growth rates as the sum of contributions of proximate sources of growth -labour, capital and total factor productivity (TFP). The latter characterises the ability of an economy to diminish real costs of production. Much of the current literature on the growth accounting of the Russian economy at the macro level pays particular attention to TFP as the main source of growth. Using various sources of data on labour and capital 2 , paying special attention to such measurement aspects as capacity utilization (Entov & Lugovoy, 2013) , terms of trade (Kaitila, 2016) or taking into account its natural capital (Brandt, Schreyer, & Zipper, 2016) , it points to TFP as the main driver of Russian growth. Recent studies of this strand of the literature also report the productivity slowdown after 2008 (Timmer & Voskoboynikov, 2016; World Bank, 2017) , which can reflect the impact of both global and country-specific factors.
So far, however, there has been little discussion of the changes in these proximate sources of the long run growth of the Russian economy after the global crisis of 2008 in the comparative perspective. The study aims to fill this gap using the update of the Russia KLEMS dataset, released in March 2017 (Russia KLEMS, 2017 ).
The present study reports that at least some of the origins of the global slowdown can be observed in Russia, comparing the pre-and post-crisis sources of growth of the Russian economy.
Specifically, it represents aggregate labour productivity growth as the sum of capital deepening and TFP growth in industries, and the contribution of labour reallocation between industries. It shows that the stagnation of 2009-2014 is more the outcome of a TFP slowdown and the deterioration of the allocation of labour rather than a lack of capital inputs. Moreover, it was found that the TFP slowdown started in Russia a few years before the crisis, as in major global economies, such as 2 See literature review in (Timmer & Voskoboynikov, 2016) OECD countries, China and Brazil. At the same time, relatively stable capital deepening makes the Russian pattern similar to resource abundant Australia and Canada, which raised investments in the mining sector in response to the capital intensive boom in China and India (McGowan et al., 2015) . Next, the contribution of ICT capital to labour productivity growth in Russia after 2008 declined, which hampers technology diffusion. Finally the structure of capital services in Russia changed after 2008. Before the crisis the contribution of machinery and equipment dominated, while after the crisis constructions and infrastructure provided the most capital inputs.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a short description of the data and the industry-level growth accounting approach. The third section summarizes the main results, starting from the aggregate view of sources of growth of the global economy in the long run (subsection 3.1), then proceeds with the impact of labour reallocation in comparison with the intraindustry sources of labour productivity growth after 1995 (3.2), and then develops the sectorial structure of capital intensity and TFP (3.3). The fourth section summarizes and concludes.
Data and Approach
There are two main sources of data for the present study. The first is the Conference Board Total Economy Database™ (TED). 3 TED is a comprehensive database with annual data covering Gross Domestic Product (GDP), population, employment, hours, labour quality, capital services, labour productivity, and TFP for 123 countries, including Russia, at the total economy level. For most countries the TED productivity series start from 1950. For Russia they are available from 1961 for GDP per worker and from 1992 for GDP per hour worked. TED provides data for the representation of labour productivity growth ∆ ln , where labour productivity is defined as the ratio of real value added and hours worked ( = ⁄ ), as the sum of the contributions of capital intensity (the flow of capital services per hour worked, = ⁄ ), labour composition effect (LQ) and TFP growth rate (∆ ln ) (Vries & Erumban, 2016, pp. 16-18) :
where ̅ are yearly averaged shares of capital (K) and labour (L) compensation in value added.
TED is based on national accounts from the official sources, such international sources as OECD or UN, and in some cases on alternative estimations in academic publications. For example, for China two sets of the series are present, the official and the alternative one. This reflects debates in the literature on the reliability of the official statistics for China. 4 For Russia TED uses official real GDP series, starting from 1990. For years before 1990 the real GDP series employ data of Kuboniwa and Ponomarenko (2000) and Ponomarenko (2002) .
Next, for comparisons of GDP levels across countries purchasing power parities (PPP) are used in TED. Unless otherwise stated, I use the GDP series in constant 1990 US dollars converted at Geary Khamis PPPs from the TED release of June 2015.
The second source is the Russia KLEMS dataset (Russia KLEMS, 2017 the Russian labor force survey, which leads to an upward bias in labour productivity levels. 5 Russia KLEMS data uses employment series, which cover the whole economy within the SNA production frontier.
(2)
where ̅ , is the annual average share of industry j in total value added, and ̅ , is the annual average capital share in value added of industry j. 
Results and discussion

Long run growth of the Russian economy in the comparative perspective
The labour productivity of the global economy accelerated from early 1990s until the eve of the crisis (Figure 1a ) fuelled by the intensive development of emerging economies and partially offset by OECD countries. However, productivity trends in the post-crisis period changed. Labour productivity in emerging economies continued growing at a moderate annual pace of 2-3%, while in OECD countries it dropped below 1%. Comparing the dynamics of labour productivity ( Figure   1a ) and TFP ( Figure 1b ) it is possible to see the role of capital deepening in the post-crisis labour productivity slowdown, which was strong in emerging economies and negligible in the OECD zone.
Overall, the global economy after 2008 demonstrates low TFP growth. In other words, the impact of efficiency improvements, which include management and organization of production processes, R&D and innovation, was lower than in previous decades (McGowan et al., 2015) . ( Figure 1c ) and a fall in TFP (Figure 1d ). 6 To a lesser degree this is applicable to Brazil and Russia.
The case of Russia is also presented in Figure 2 by the growth rates of labour productivity and its In what follows I consider all of these three issues, starting from the long run global productivity pattern of major economies in terms of the convergence theory (Acemoglu, Aghion, & Zilibotti, 2006) .
[Figure 3. Labour productivity performance in the long run]
The long run comparative perspective of labour productivity trends since 1950 are presented in Figure 3 . 7 This long time span is split into four sub-periods in line with structural breaks of the US productivity pattern (see, for example, Fernald (2015)). Figure 3a represents annual labour productivity growth rates of leading market economies and economic regions, while tangible investments, the impact on investments in knowledge-based and human capital, and on labour reallocation (McGowan et al., 2015, pp. 24-32) .
In this context, there are three potential explanations of this post-crisis stagnation in Russia.
The first is the global productivity slowdown. Second is the structural transformation of the Russian economy, from the sectors of material production, overinvested in before transition, to market services. Using Baumol's terminology, such a structural change can shift activities from progressive manufacturing to stagnant services (Baumol, Blackman, & Wolff, 1985) . Finally, the slowdown can be rooted in the fall of oil and gas revenues after the fall of oil prices in the late 2000s. Further analysis of the proximate sources of growth can help clarify which of the three explanations will be born out by the evidence.
Aggregate growth, structural change and labour reallocation in Russia since 1995
The economic structure of command economies was unbalanced in favour of manufacturing and agriculture. That is why the extension of market services and shrinking manufacturing was one of a few basic facts, common for all economies in transition (Campos & Coricelli, 2002) . Russia is no exception. Table 1 Finance and business services demonstrate the best performance with yearly average growth rates of 8.4%. However, its contribution is a more modest 0.7 p.p., giving place to oil and gas, and market services (RCT) sectors, because the average share of the finance industry is only 8.6% (0.7 = 8.41  8 The true size of mining in the Russian economy and its contribution to economic growth were widely discussed in the literature (see, e.g., (Gurvich, 2004) ). An extended oil and gas sector includes organizations, which are involved in the process of extraction, transportation and wholesale trade of oil and gas. Some of them have establishments in different industries, such as mining, wholesale trade, fuel and pipeline transport. Because of strong vertical integration and transfer pricing its share in total value added exceeds mining. Following Timmer and Voskoboynikov (2016) the present study assumes that all this extended mining sector includes mining, wholesale trade and fuel. At the same time, I recognize limitations of this split. On the one hand, many firms in wholesale trade are not related with energy exports. On the other hand, some pipeline transportation organizations fall within transport in sector "market services".
½  (5.1%+12.0%)). These three sectors provide the most real value added growth, while the role of traditional industries of material production is relatively modest. Agriculture and manufacturing contribute only 0.5 p.p. of the 3.5% aggregate growth.
The periods for the comparative analysis are important, because short term changes in input utilization can bias TFP estimations (Hulten, 1986) . Realizing this, I opted for years of subperiods, which are neither the trough, nor the peak of the cycle. The first year in question is 1995, which belongs to the period of the transformational recession. 2002 is one of the first recovery years after the financial crisis of 1998. Finally, 2007 is the eve of the global financial crisis, which can be considered as the final point of the recovery period. In all cases these years did not belong to local minimum points of capital capacity utilization for Russian manufacturing (Bessonov, 2004; Galimov, Gnidchenko, Mikheeva, Rybalka, & Salnikov, 2017) .
[Table 2. Growth accounting decomposition of the market sector of the Russian economy in 1995-2014]
Table 2 presents major sources of economic growth of the market sector of the economy in these three periods. What stands out is the remarkable difference in the structure of these sources. and disappeared during the years of stagnation, which can illustrate both the end of the transition and the worsening of labour mobility in years following the global crisis. 10 I suggest two different explanations for this. The contribution of structural change to labour productivity growth, which is also referred to as a structural bonus, is higher in economies with higher initial variation of labour productivity levels across industries. In developed economies this variation is usually small and the structural bonus is also marginal, while in developing economies it can be substantial. From this perspective, being industrialized, the CEE economies and Russia did not have much room for the structural bonus. It follows from the fact that in 1995 the variation coefficients of labour productivity levels in industries were significantly lower in CEE and Russia than in market economies with a similar level of development (Timmer & Voskoboynikov, 2016) .
The second explanation comes from the observation that structural change in post-transition countries shifts the structure of these economies to services. In turn, long run productivity growth in services can be lower than in, say, manufacturing (Baumol et al., 1985) . That is why the expansion of services can lead to the slowdown of the aggregate labour productivity growth (the Baumol effect). However, both in Russia and in the post-transition economies of CEE the Baumol effect, being negative, is cancelled out by labour reallocation to industries with higher productivity levels (the Denison effect) (Voskoboynikov, 2018) .
Taken together, the results of this section suggest that the influence of structural change on aggregate labour productivity growth is more sophisticated than might be expected from decomposition (2). The relatively small contribution of reallocation can be the net effect of two different phenomena, the Denison effect and the Baumol effect, which work in different directions and cancel each other out. These opposing contributions of the two types of labour reallocation are common for all post-transition economies. Finally, the expansion of informality also weakens growth enhancing structural change (Voskoboynikov, 2017) .
However, the main conclusion of the aggregate shift share analysis remains unchanged.
Namely, intra-industry sources of productivity growth are stronger than the reallocation effects. In what follows I consider these sources in detail, paying special attention to the proximate sources of labour productivity growth in industries and the sectoral contribution of capital services and TFP to the aggregate.
Labour productivity slowdown in industries after 2008: lack of capital or efficiency loss?
The sources of intra-industry labour productivity growth include the accumulation of human and physical capital, intangible assets, and TFP. The latter is usually interpreted as the outcome of technological change, but could be also explained by temporary disequilibrium caused by the delayed reaction to technological changes in previous periods, terms of trade, low mobility of labour and capital, as well as various competitive barriers (Reinsdorf, 2015) .
The growth accounting decomposition of the market sector of the economy sheds light on the differences in the proximate sources of growth before and after 2008. The analysis of sectoral components and the contribution of different types of assets might be helpful in understanding the origins of this labour productivity decline. Figure 4 shows that the TFP fall happened mostly because of efficiency losses in the oil and gas sector. Taking into account industry-level patterns of productivity growth (Appendices A2 and A3) this could happen because of the TFP fall in wholesale trade only. Almost all other sectors are also in the negative zone. The only exception is agriculture, which demonstrates high TFP growth rates both before and after
2008. 11 Unfortunately, the value added share of agriculture is just above 4% (Table 1) More attention is also expected, dealing with capital intensity. The transmission of oil and gas export revenues to the supply side sources of growth should be identified not only because of a substantial capital contribution at the aggregate level, but also in the sectoral composition of the aggregate capital input. It is confirmed by the data reported in Figure 5 . The extended oil and gas sector demonstrates the second largest yearly average contribution among sectors of the market economy in 2002-2007. It contributes almost one quarter of the market economy capital intensity growth rates. Market services enjoyed the highest capital inflow. This is also not surprising. Large investments were made in retail, which was underdeveloped in early transition. McKinsey (1999 McKinsey ( , p. 5, 2009 reports that by 1999 only 1% of retail occurred in modern supermarkets, while in 2009 this share increased to 35%. Huge investments were made in telecommunications both because of its technological backwardness in the planned economy period and the IT revolution.
Last, but not least, financial and business services also expanded during these years.
[Figure 6. Contributions of types of assets to aggregate capital intensity growth]
Finally, Figure 6 illustrates changes in the contribution of different types of assets to labour productivity growth. In 1995-2002 capital deepening was negative despite the substantial labour outflow. In contrast, in the post-crisis recovery years, capital intensity grew mostly because of contributions of oil and gas, RCT and manufacturing. However, if RCT sector and oil and gas grew mostly because of the inflow of investment, capital intensity in manufacturing and agriculture grew also because of continuing labour outflow. Finally, in the period of stagnation capital intensity continues growing with the increasing role of oil and gas.
The structure of asset contributions to aggregate capital intensity, presented in Figure 
Conclusion
There are global factors, which accelerate and decelerate long-run productivity of national Notes: Labour productivity growth is measured as GDP per person employed. Total factor productivity growth measures GDP growth over the weighted average of total hours worked, taking into account labour skills, and also machinery, structures and ICT capital. World refers to 122 countries, which are present in the Database. Emerging market end developing countries include China, India, the other developing Asia economies, Latin America, Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia, Central Asia and Southern East Europe. Note: Labour productivity growth is measured as GDP per hour worked. Capital intensity is the flow of capital services per hour worked. Total factor productivity growth measures GDP growth over the weighted average of total hours worked, machinery, structures, IT, CT, software, transport equipment and other assets. 
